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ABSTRACT: The textbook-like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, re-
ceived views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have witnessed a huge 
amount of historical work that aimed to reconsider our narratives of the history of ana-
lytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. The present study is meant to present such  
a micro story which is still quite untouched by historians. According to the received 
view Kripke has defeated all the arguments of Quine against quantified modal logic and 
thus it became a respectful tool for philosophers. If we accept the historical interpreta-
tion of the network between Quine, Kripke and modal logic, which is to be presented 
here, we have to conclude that Quine’s real philosophical animadversions against the 
modalities are still on the table: though Kripke has provided some important (formal-
logical) answers, Quine’s animadversions are still viable and worthy of further considera-
tion. 
KEYWORDS: History of analytic philosophy – quantified modal logic – Saul Kripke – 
Willard van Orman Quine. 
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 Modality and especially (quantified) modal logic (abbreviated as QML) 
has played an important role in twentieth-century analytic philosophy. In 
the early years it was considered suspicious, sometimes even meaningless. 
Among the main proponents of this skeptical attitude we find Willard van 
Orman Quine, whose considerations against the modalities (or any inten-
sional items) date back to his doctoral dissertation (1932/1990), when he 
“reworked the foundations of Principia Mathematica in strictly extensional 
terms, and propositional functions to the winds” (Quine 1990/2004, 55). 
His very first explicit ‘attack’ directed against modal logic is to be found in 
his contribution to the Schilpp volume of A. N. Whitehead (Quine 1941, 
141-142, especially n26), where he argued that the modal operators violate 
certain basic rules of extensional predicate logic, therefore it is dubious 
whether the modal notions could be integrated into the regimented lan-
guage of science (a language based on extensional first-order predicate logic 
with identity) which was one of the few conditions of meaningfulness. 
 This kind of skepticism of Quine surfaced in most of his writings from 
the 1940s until his death, and posthumously published Confessions of  
a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays.2
 As the typical text-book-like story goes, it was Saul Kripke and his 
possible-worlds semantics of modal logic that played a crucial role in 
 One of his major problems 
was the following reduction-challenge: “There are logicians, myself among 
them, to whom the ideas of modal logic (e.g. [C.I.] Lewis’s) are not intui-
tively clear until explained in non-modal terms” (Quine 1947, 43). Besides 
empiricism, the source of this conception is that Quine (2001/2008, 500) 
used to mark the boundaries of meaningfulness around classical extensional 
predicate logic with identity: “I doubt that I have ever fully understood  
anything that I could not explain in extensional language.” 
 Though only a minority of logicians and philosophers (like Ruth Bar-
can Marcus, Rudolf Carnap, Alonzo Church and Arthur Smullyan) have re-
sponded explicitly to Quine’s animadversions, QML gradually became  
a respectful tool after the 1960s and one could hardly imagine any meta-
physical or linguistic analysis that was not using the modal vocabulary as  
a respectful tool. 
                                                     
2  See Quine (2008); the relevant works are Quine (1941; 1943; 1947; 1951; 1953; 
1953/1966; 1960, chapter 6; 1963/1966; 1977; 1992/2008; 2001/2008). 
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changing the philosophical atmosphere. In the 1980s, Hintikka formulated 
this point according to the lines of the familiar story: 
The possibility of a reasonable modal logic was denied by Quine on phi-
losophical grounds, but his objections have been dead for a while, even 
though they have not yet been completely buried. What has made  
a crucial difference is the development of what has generally been taken 
to be a viable semantics (model theory) for modal logic. This semantics has 
provided a basis from which Quine’s objections can apparently be ans-
wered satisfactorily and which yields a solid foundation for the different 
axiom systems for modal logic. (Hintikka, 1982/1989, 1) 
Recently Joseph Melia has framed this idea in a very similar way: 
We shall see that such worries [Quine’s worries] were largely misguided 
and that the possible worlds machinery provides us with the conceptual 
tools to see off all such objections. (Melia 2003, 63) 
We have examined Quine’s arguments against modal logic, and we have 
found them all lacking. The defenders of modal logic, be it proposi-
tional or predicative, have nothing to fear from Quine and are quite 
within their rights to take modal truths and modal logic seriously, and 
to search for a respectable theory of modality. (Melia 2003, 79) 
 I will claim that one part of Hintikka’s report was adequate, but the 
other hasn’t captured the force and aims of Quine’s original animadver-
sions. The adequate part of the claim is that Kripkean semantics indeed 
yields a solid foundation for the various axiom systems of modal logic – in 
some of his less known papers Quine has also accepted the formal results of 
Kripke’s investigations. But the other claim of Hintikka – which is just the 
received, text-book-like story about Quine and QML – that says that 
Kripkean semantics has fully answered the Quinean arguments against the 
meaningfulness of the modalities cannot be maintained in such a simple 
form. We can detect various textual evidences where both Kripke and 
Quine state that the Kripke-semantics in itself is just mathematics, a formal 
investigation which cannot yield philosophically interesting results, i.e. it is 
not the required interpretation that Quine has demanded. Though there 
seems to be a consensus about the major theses of Kripke’s philosophy 
(about rigid designation, natural kinds and metaphysical necessity) the field 
is still open for further debate. 
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 By bringing together these historical claims we can uncover a highly 
different story of the twentieth-century analytic philosophy and modal log-
ic. We can also show – though I will do no more than sketch the main idea 
– that the later philosophical works of Kripke and David Lewis could be 
integrated into this picture – they both provide the required form of in-
tended or philosophical interpretation that Quine was demanding, though 
neither of them is acceptable for Quine for various reasons. 
1. Methodological considerations 
 The present study summarizes partly the recent ideas about Quine and 
QML. Though one can still find some further “received-view-like” claims 
about these issues, in the last few years scholars like John Burgess 
(1998/2008; 2013), Stephen Neale (2000), Kit Fine (1989; 1990), Zsófia 
Zvolenszky (2006; 2007; 2010), Roberta Ballarin (2004) and earlier David 
Kaplan (1969; 1986) did a lot to rewrite the story and to reorient our 
thinking. 
 Taking a special approach to history and historiography we can distin-
guish three approaches: (i) systematic-narrative, (ii) argumentative, (iii) mi-
cro-historical. The first one results in a certain history of ideas, in a com-
prehensive and systematic narrative, usually based on a singular point of 
view, which tries to reconstruct the given story on a unified line. A typical 
example is that analytic philosophy is united by the ideas of the linguistic 
turn. The second embraces an argumentative point of view according to 
which we have to investigate the explicit statements and arguments of the 
individual thinkers, taking them to be hypothetical participants in our con-
temporary philosophical debates (this method is used by Scott Soames in 
his Philosophical Analysis in Twentieth Century). Such an approach is much 
less sensitive to the contextual factors offered by a narrative account. It is 
receptive instead to bare claims and arguments, lifted from their historical 
contexts. These have to hold up by themselves, facing the contemporary 
critics in our current space of reasons. 
 The third (iii) approach makes a far more moderate claim – it does not 
want to argue directly with the figures depicted as contemporaries, nor to 
generate a systematic and unifying narrative. Instead it sees its task in writ-
ing certain well defined micro histories – in such a suitably restricted story 
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the heroes can be certain thinkers and their oeuvre which are unknown and 
isolated from the point of view of the ‘big picture’, various scientific con-
troversies and disputes and their participants, or the reconstruction of the 
(un)published works in the light of their reception. Erich Reck formulates 
a similar point of view: 
[…] we carefully recover – using tools borrowed from history, philology, 
as well as from philosophy (archival research, close textual exegesis, and 
attention to context) – what the philosopher’s core concepts, basic as-
sumptions, and main project actually were. We also refrain, at least in-
itially, from evaluating the recovered ideas by using current standards. 
What we do, on the other hand, is to think them through internally, 
i.e., to evaluate them by using the standards and the understanding of 
the time. The latter is what makes the approach philosophical (not just 
‘historical reconstruction as history’, but ‘historical reconstruction as phi-
losophy’). It is also what makes it a form of ‘historicism’, albeit a relative-
ly modest one. (Reck 2013, 12) 
 The revisionary points of the aforementioned scholars are connected to 
approaches (i) and (ii) thus I will formulate my points on the base of their 
results. Some more quotations, however, from the primary materials are al-
so provided to strengthen their claims from a more historical point of view. 
I shall join their efforts by calling attention to certain micro-stories regard-
ing Quine, Kripke and the impact of their work and explaining some fea-
tures of the received view on the basis of these considerations. 
 Considering logical and philosophical textbooks along with the relevant 
secondary literature from the second half of twentieth century, we can ab-
stract a certain received or official view about Quine and QML. Talking 
about the ‘received view’ does not mean that there really is a unified story 
about Quine and QML which is shared by everyone working on this topic 
– it is only a useful formulation of certain well known ideas, and it has  
a certain heuristic value for the later argumentation. 
 The received view can be characterized with various dogmas as shown 
by Burgess (1998/2008) but I will restrict my focus and will discuss only 
two of them:3
                                                     
3  For a much comprehensive list see the groundbreaking work of Burgess 
(1998/2008). 
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 (RV1) QML does not commit one to essentialism, since the essentialist 
theses cannot be derived in the usual systems. 
 (RV2) The (model-theoretic) possible-worlds semantics pointed out 
that QML could be interpreted in a meaningful way; therefore 
Quine’s critique (that QML is meaningless) has been defeated. 
2. Quine and essentialism 
 According to (RV1) the essentialist-charge states that QML is commit-
ted to the untenable view of essentialism. Quine claimed that essentialism 
comes into play when one tries to combine, for example, the notion of ne-
cessity to open sentences like: (∃x)(x > 7). At this point Quine was 
mainly concerned with the concepts of linguistic (or verbal) modalities. Fo-
cusing on necessity, linguistic necessity, as Zvolenszky has put it (following 
Burgess), covers both analytic and logical necessity: “for both concern truth 
in virtue of the meanings of certain expressions; the difference is only 
whether we consider the meanings of all vocabulary items or just the logical 
ones” (Zvolenszky 2010, 43).  
 Having this in mind, Quine’s problem could be formulated as follows. If 
one tries to substitute for the variable x ‘nine’ one gets that ‘necessarily 
nine is greater than seven’ which is true. On the other hand if one substi-
tutes for x ‘the number of planets’ one gets ‘necessarily the number of pla-
nets is greater than seven’ which is presumably false. Given that nine is just 
the number of planets, the two expressions are coreferring, and hence subs-
tituting them for the same variable should yield sentences with the same 
truth-value. 
 In some of his writings Quine concluded that in certain contexts it does 
matter how we name things, that is, the form of the names. As he says: 
An occurrence of the name in which the name refers simply to the ob-
ject designated, I shall call purely designative. Failure of substitutivity re-
veals merely that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely designa-
tive, and that the statement depends not only upon the object but on 
the form of the name. For it is clear that whatever can be affirmed 
about the object remains true when we refer to the object by any other 
name. (Quine 1943, 114) 
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 For Quine, the not purely designative constructions are the typical cases 
of the modalities: while the object, the number nine (in and of itself) under 
the name ‘nine’ is necessarily greater than seven, under a different name, for 
example, ‘the number of planets’, it is not necessarily greater than seven, be 
it either the case that it is not analytic that “the number of planets is great-
er than seven” or that it is not a logical truth. 
 But one of the most important metaphilosophical commitments of 
Quine is that he reads the quantifiers objectually. The objectual interpreta-
tion of the quantifiers means that the admissible values of the variables 
bounded by the quantifiers are objects simpliciter. Quine used to call this in-
terpretation the ordinary sense of quantification, “corresponding to the 
sense of the parallel pronominal constructions of ordinary language.”4
 Recall Quine’s (1953/1966) famous three grades of modal involvement: 
in the first grade we attach the modal operators to sentences as metalinguis-
tic predicates; in the second we attach the modal notions only to closed for-
mulas – it is parallel with the use of negation; but in the third grade the 
modal operators are capable of attaching to open formulas. When we are 
concerned with open sentences the primary elements are just the objects, 
hence we attach the modal items (for example properties as “necessarily be-
ing such-and-such”) to the objects.
 Giv-
en this reading of the quantifiers it seems that they are neutral with respect 
to the form of the names of the objects since they are concerned with the 
values of the variables which are objects simpliciter. 
5
                                                     
4  Quine’s letter to Carnap, QC/105/1943-5-7, in Creath (1990, 328). 
5  It is important to note that we are dealing with the objectual interpretation since, as 
Quine emphasized, “if […] we do not have quantification in the old sense, then I have 
nothing to suggest at this point about the ontological implications or difficulties of 
modal logic” (Quine’s response, in Marcus et al. 1962/1993, 27). 
 
 Now we would like to say that there is an object x (namely the number 
nine) which is necessarily greater than seven, and there is exactly x planets 
and it is not necessarily that there is x planets. We should be able to say 
that the following sentence (even using a hybrid language) is meaningful: 
 (∃x)[(x > 7) ∧ there are just x planets ∧ ¬ (there are just x planets)] 
and in general that 
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 (∃x)(Fx ∧ Gx ∧ ¬Gx). 
 According to our earlier example, it is necessary that nine is greater 
than seven and it is true that the number of planets is nine but it is not ne-
cessary that the number of planets is also nine, since it could have been five 
(if there were only five planets). Quine thought that in QML “quantifying 
in” could be meaningful only if we distribute modal properties with respect 
to the form of names (cf. Quine 1953, 147-148). That is, while under the 
label ‘9’ it is necessary that nine is greater than seven, the same holds for 
the label ‘5+4’, but under ‘the number of planets’ it seems that it is not. 
Under certain descriptions things bear their properties necessarily while 
under different descriptions they do not. 
 But regarding the quantifiers, in order to do their job we shall not deal 
with the mode or form of naming: “quantification, ordinarily understood, 
abstracts from the mode in which objects are designated.”6
 So the tension in QML can be formulated as follows: according to the 
usual objectual interpretation of the quantifiers the mode of naming is not 
important, while the modalities, when we try to understand them as verbal, 
or linguistic modalities, are to be attached to the names (or generally to the 
linguistic considerations) of the objects. Therefore QML has to take ac-
count of the modes of naming and leave them out of consideration at the 
same time. Since for Quine the usual quantificational strategies have priori-
ty, we have to settle with the latter option, namely to leave behind the 
form of the names. But this means that we have to attach the modalities 
directly to the objects and hence we have to say that the number nine in and 
of itself bears some of its properties necessarily and some of them accident-
ly.
 The truth of  
a formula like ‘(∃x)(x > 7)’ depends on the existence of an object which is 
greater than seven and not on the naming of things. On Quine’s view this 
means that we do not have to tie the accidental and necessary properties to 
the linguistic descriptions of objects (or to the meanings) but to the objects 
themselves. 
7
                                                     
6  The formulation is from Leonard Linsky who owes it to one of his students. See 
Linsky (1969, 695, n10). 
 
7  Quine considered the possibility of reading the quantifiers, for example, in an inten-
sional way (as, according to him, Carnap did in his Meaning and Necessity) but he 
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 This view is usually called (Aristotelian) essentialism: 
This is the doctrine that some of the attributes of a thing (quite inde-
pendently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at all) may be 
essential to the thing, and others accidental. (Quine 1953/1966, 173-
174; italics added) 
This is how essentialism comes in: the invidious distinction between 
some traits of an object as essential to it (by whatever name) and other 
traits of it as accidental. (Quine 1962/1966, 182) 
An object, of itself and by whatever name or none, must be seen as hav-
ing some of its traits necessarily and others contingently, despite the 
fact that the latter traits follow just as analytically from some ways of 
specifying the object as the former traits do from other ways of specify-
ing it. (Quine 1953/1961, 155; italics added) 
 This kind of essentialism was incompatible with Quine’s (1953/1961, 
156) scientific naturalism: “Such a philosophy is as unreasonable by my 
lights as it is by Carnap’s or [C. I.] Lewis’s.” According to Quine the exis-
tential questions are to be dealt with by science and scientific inquiries: 
since philosophy is not in a position to answer these questions science has to 
inform us whether there are essential properties or not.8 Inasmuch the lat-
ter does not claim that there are such things, their conception is just plain 
metaphysics for Quine (1953/1966, 174): “[QML] leads us back into the 
metaphysical jungle of Aristotelian essentialism.”9
                                                     
claimed that “if you take quantification in some such new sense, you depart from the 
topic of my article” QC/105/1943-5-7, in Creath (1990, 328). 
8  About Quine’s naturalism see Gregory (2008) and Weir (2014). 
 
9  There is an interesting parallel between Neurath and Quine on this issue. As Quine 
used to attack Carnap’s semantics and considerations of modal logic in the 1950s, Neu-
rath has argued against Carnapian semantics as early as the 1930s but mainly in the 
1940s after the publication of Carnap’s Introduction to Semantics. In a letter to Carnap 
Neurath said that “I am really depressed to see here all the Aristotelian metaphysics in 
full glint and glamour, bewitching my dear friend Carnap through and through” (Neu-
rath to Carnap, January 15, 1943, ASP RC 102-55-02). For Neurath semantics in Car-
napian (and Tarskian) style entails metaphysics and thus it undermines empiricism; he 
thought that “it [is] rather dangerous to speak of the DESIGNATUM of an expression” 
and therefore tried to reformulate the semantical concepts in a behavioristic way and 
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 We can reconstruct a typical argument from the secondary literature 
which tried to capture the main points of Quine’s considerations (cf. Par-
sons 1967):  
 (P1) QML is committed to essentialism 
 (P2) Essentialism is an untenable, incoherent view. 
 (C) Therefore QML is untenable and incoherent. 
 This argument did not strike Quine as having a devastating conse-
quence: 
[…] in conclusion I say, as Carnap and [C. I.] Lewis have not: so much 
worse for quantified modal logic as well; for if we do not propose to quan-
tify across the necessity operator, the use of that operator ceases to have 
any clear advantage over merely quoting a sentence and saying it is ana-
lytic. (Quine 1953/1961, 156, italics added) 
 Philosophers in the 1960s used to attack the first premise of this argu-
ment pointing out that QML is not committed to essentialism. The very 
first defender of QML against the essentialist-charge was Ruth Barcan 
Marcus (Marcus 1967/1993), who was followed by Parsons (1967; 1969) 
and Linsky (1969). They have argued that QML is committed to essential-
ism only in a very trivial sense; we can prove, for example, statements that 
claim self-identity, or that everything bears a certain property or not – that 
is we are committed in a modal system only to non-substantial, trivial essen-
tialist claims like, everything is necessarily red or not-red (they are, so to 
say, logico-essentialist claims) but we cannot prove such statements as 
‘something is essentially a mathematician’ (see Marcus 1962/1993). This 
trivial sense of essentialism, as Dagfinn Føllesdal has claimed,  
is no more objectionable than the modal operators themselves, when 
applied to closed formulae. In the case of other types of nonextensional 
contexts […] the corresponding notions are required in order to permit 
quantification into such contexts. So, in this extended sense of ‘essen-
tialism’, we are all essentialists. (Føllesdal 1986/1998, 104) 
                                                     
claim that “I suggest to speak of an ACCEPTED SENTENCE (or of a designating sen-
tence), instead of a denotatum I suggest to speak of an ‘acknowledged’ expression […]” 
(Neurath to Carnap April 1, 1944, ASP RC 102-55-05). 
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 Marcus and Parsons tried to strengthen their arguments by pointing 
out certain mistakes in Quine’s argumentation. Parsons argued, for exam-
ple, that in the reconstruction of Quine’s argument we find an equivocation 
with respect to ‘essentialism’. In (P1), according to Parsons, we have to 
consider only a trivial essentialism, while in (P2) we find a different and 
stronger sense of it which cannot be proven in QML. Therefore Quine’s 
argument simply fails to reach the required conclusion. 
 Nonetheless a more subtle reconstruction of Quine’s claims shows that 
essentialist-charge could be upheld even in the face of the Marcus-Parsons 
arguments. Dagfinn Føllesdal (1986/1998) argued for the thesis that in the 
writings of Quine we have to deal with two different essentialist-charges. 
On the one hand there is a certain weak-essentialist-charge (WEC) and  
a strong-essentialist-charge (SEC): 
The first, weak notion was developed in response to Carnap, Lewis, and 
others, who championed quantified modal logic while at the same time 
rejecting as metaphysical nonsense the traditional Aristotelian view that 
necessity inheres in things and not in language. […] Quine saw that Carnap 
and Lewis’s linguistic conception of necessity was untenable if one 
wants to quantify into modal contexts, and that their position therefore 
was incoherent. (Føllesdal 1986/1998, 98; italics added) 
 According to (WEC) we have to make a distinction between a thing’s 
necessary and accidental properties and this distinction inheres not in the 
way we talk about things but in the things themselves, in and of themselves. 
Quine claims that if we want to interpret QML, then we must tie essen-
tialism to the things but do not have to say anything about what could be 
the essences. At this point there is no need to commit oneself to any non-
trivial essential property, what matters is only the distinction and that it 
inheres in the things, not in the language.  
 Essentialism, however, got a stronger sense, (SEC). It says that things 
have in themselves individual, unique essences; it says that there are certain 
essences which belong only to one individual: x has a certain x-ness, which 
is x’s essence. (SEC) appears, for example, when we are dealing with trans-
world identity, and we don’t have to consider it here. Føllesdal (1986/1998) 
states that for Quine in the 1940s-1960s what was at stake is (WEC), but 
after that in the 1970s Quine was putting forward (SEC) and hence causing 
certain interpretational confusions for others.  
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 What is more important is that Marcus and Parsons haven’t met the 
Quinean challenges. The reason is that Quine, already in 1962 at the Bos-
ton Colloquium, has made his arguments explicit; i.e. he is not talking 
about proving essentialism in QML:  
I’ve never said or, I’m sure, written that essentialism could be proved in 
any system of modal logic whatever. I’ve never even meant to suggest 
that any modal logician even was aware of the essentialism he was 
committing himself to, even implicitly in the sense of putting it into his 
axioms. I’m talking about quite another thing – I’m not talking about theo-
rems, I’m talking about truth, I’m talking about true interpretation. And 
what I have been arguing is that if one is to quantify into modal con-
texts and one is to interpret these modal contexts in the ordinary modal 
way and one is to interpret quantification as quantification, not in some 
quasi-quantificatory way that puts the truth conditions in terms of 
substitutions of expressions, then in order to get a coherent interpretation 
one has to adopt essentialism and I already explained a while ago just 
how that comes about. But I did not say that it could ever be deduced in 
any of the S-systems or any system I’ve ever seen. (Quine’s response, see 
Marcus et al. 1962/1993, 32; italics added.) 
 Earlier in the discussion Marcus argued that we cannot prove any dis-
turbing essentialist claims in QML, thus Quine’s arguments fail against 
QML. Quine pointed out two things in his response. He said that he 
wasn’t talking about proving essentialism in the systems of QML. From 
this point of view the articles of Marcus and Parsons pointed out rightly 
that such theorems are not available in QML, but they miss the point. 
Keeping this in mind, it is even stranger that though Quine made these 
claims in 1962, Marcus and Parsons in their published articles at the end of 
the 1960s were attributing to Quine a non-Quinean position. 
 On the other hand, Quine did not specify the list of essential properties 
and the non-trivial essences have not appeared at this point either. They 
will be relevant only after the 1970s and not in the sense of provability – 
Quine has localized the essentialist commitments in the use of QML. Since 
the language of QML is stronger than that of classical logic, we can formu-
late in it certain statements that cannot be stated in classical logic. That is, 
when we are talking in the language of QML and using modal operators in 
the formalization of statements of ordinary language, we can formulate sen-
tences whose interpretation shows the signs of essentialism. Modal logic 
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commits us to essentialism when we are using it to express ourselves and 
not at the level of provability and deducibility. This problem is closely tied 
to what Quine has called ‘true interpretation’, but to discuss it, we have to 
move on to the second point of (RV). 
3. Quine and interpretation 
 (RV2) states that Quine’s arguments against QML have been defeated 
mainly due to Kripke’s model-theoretic possible-worlds semantics. One of 
the main reasons behind Quine’s animadversions against QML was that it 
violates the rules of extensionality.10
 It seems that Kripke has indeed defeated Quine’s arguments (since he 
has provided the required purely extensional means for the semantics of the 
modalities) and seemingly Quine accepted this point which could be based 
on the fact that he has not published much about the modalities after 
Kripkean semantics has appeared in the early 1960s.
 Kripke was well aware of the usual ex-
tensionalist tendencies of his time and tried to motivate his approach from 
that point of view: 
It is noteworthy that the theorems of this paper can be formalized in  
a metalanguage (such as Zermelo set theory) which is ‘extensional’, both 
in the sense of possessing set-theoretic axioms of extensionality and in 
the sense of postulating no sentential connectives other than the truth-
functions. Thus it is seen that at least a certain non-trivial portion of the 
semantics of modality is available to an extensionalist logician. (Kripke 
1959a, 3; italics added) 
11
The notion of possible world did indeed contribute to the semantics of 
modal logic, and it behooves us to recognize the nature of its contribu-
  
 In the 1970s, however, two publications appeared from Quine which 
show a different picture and attitude: 
                                                     
10  About Quine’s extensionalism see Bar-Am (2012) and Kemp (2014). 
11  The last longer discussion of the modalities could be found in his Word and Object 
from 1960 (§41). In his most famous later writings, Pursuit of Truth (see Quine 
1990/1992, 73-74) and From Stimulus to Science (see Quine 1995, 99 and 90-95), he dis-
cussed the modalities only a few pages altogether. 
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tion: it led to Kripke’s precocious and significant theory of models of 
modal logic. Models afford consistency proofs; also they have heuristic 
value; but they do not constitute explication. Models, however clear they 
be in themselves, may leave us still at a loss for the primary, intended in-
terpretation. When modal logic has been paraphrased in terms of such 
notions as possible world or rigid designator, where the displaced fog 
settles is on the question when to identify objects between worlds, or 
when to treat a designator as rigid, or where to attribute meta-physical 
necessity. (Quine 1972, 492-493; italics added) 
A rigid designator differs from others in that it picks out its object by 
essential traits. It designates the object in all possible worlds in which it 
exists. Talk of possible worlds is a graphic way of waging the essentialist phi-
losophy, but it is only that; it is not an explication. Essence is needed to 
identify an object from one possible world to another. (Quine 1977, 8) 
 In these passages Quine claimed that Kripkean semantics is indeed  
a huge step in order to interpret QML meaningfully. He admitted that the 
model-theoretic semantics provides various technical insights and results 
(completeness, soundness, paradox free structures etc.). He also pointed 
out, however, that (RV2) builds upon an equivocation. 
 We can talk about ‘semantics’ in the sense of mathematical theory of 
models, where the modelling of the relevant semantical notions are based on 
mathematical structures and formal relations; and on the other hand we 
can talk about ‘semantics’ as the philosophical theory of meaning. As Burgess 
(1998/2008, 216, italics added) says, both approaches are important but 
serve different purposes: “A mathematical theory of models could refute  
a technical claim to the effect that the common systems are formally incon-
sistent, but without some further gloss it cannot say anything against a phi-
losophical claim that the common systems are intuitively unintelligible.”12
                                                     
12  Cf. with Quine (1962/1966, 176-177): “Still, man is a sense-making animal, and as 
such he derives little comfort from quantifying into modal contexts that he does not 
think he understands.” Note the case of the Barcan-formulas. In certain formal seman-
tics we can validate both the Barcan-formula and its converse. However, not everyone 
would admit the both of them are legitimate from a philosophical and metaphysical 
point of view. We can build up model-theoretic semantics in such a way that we vali-
date only one of them but we certainly have to motivate this step from outside of the 
model theory. 
 My 
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claim is not simply that philosophical semantics, considered as a theory of 
meaning, is something radically different from mathematical semantics, 
considered as a branch of model theory, and therefore the second type of 
semantics cannot resolve directly problems stemming from the first type of 
semantics, since this would be almost trivially true. I would like to show ra-
ther that (i) the received view seems to claim that Kripke’s model-theoretic 
semantics has indeed defeated Quine’s arguments and (ii) that this view is 
mistaken and that (iii) neither participant of the ‘debate’ held the mistaken 
view.13
 Even though when this passage from 1987 was published a reductive 
analysis of modality, put forward by David Lewis who has been emphasiz-
ing his reductive approach at least from his 1968 article about counterparts, 
was already in play, Quine’s remark could be read as an important warning: 
using merely possible worlds is just defining necessity in terms of possibility 
and negation. If we are satisfied with circular non-reductive definitions we 
could use our adverbs without advocating such entities like possible 
worlds.
 
 Quine is quite consistent on this point since he shows that even if the 
model-theoretic semantics of modal logic is viable, we still have to account 
for those possible worlds and individuals which seem to surface in these 
settings. He claims, for example, that if we try to rely on possible worlds, 
we risk that our approach will be non-reductive or even circular: 
[…] let us come to grips with necessity as such. It is not easy. A leaf 
that latter day philosophers have taken from Leibniz’s book explains ne-
cessity as truth in all possible worlds. Whatever clarity can be gained 
from explaining necessity in terms of possibility, however, can be gained 
more directly: a sentence is necessarily true if it is not possibly false. 
‘Necessarily’ means ‘not possibly not’. And we can equally well explain 
possibility in terms of necessity: ‘possibly’ means ‘not necessarily not’. 
We understand both adverbs or neither. (Quine 1987, 139-140; italics 
added) 
14
                                                     
13  As Burgess (1998/2008, 216) claims, all the earlier literature “involve[s] essentially 
the same error, confusing Quine’s philosophical complaint with some formal claim”. 
 
14  Of course for Quine (1972, 493), as a committed Humean, non-reductive defini-
tions of modality won’t work since our world is wholly non-modal: “everything is what 
it is, ask not what it may or must be”. This phrase is a response to Kripke (1971, 160), 
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 Besides his misgivings about possible worlds, on the other hand, in his 
notorious “On What There Is” from 1948, Quine formulated his skeptical 
remarks about (individuating) possible individuals: 
Take, for instance, the possible fat man in that doorway, and, again, the 
possible bald man in that doorway. Are they the same possible man, or 
two possible men? How do we decide? How many possible men are 
there in that doorway? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? 
How many of them are alike? Or would their being alike make them 
one? […] Or, finally, is the concept of identity simply inapplicable to 
unactualized possibles? But what sense can be found in talking of enti-
ties which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves 
and distinct from one another? These elements are well high incorrigi-
ble? (Quine 1948, 23-24) 
As we noted earlier, this problem could be fixed with the help of strong es-
sentialism, but Quine couldn’t accept it for the mentioned reasons. 
 So, in the context of Quine’s writings we can formulate the problem as 
follows: even if we provide a suitable formal semantics for modal logic, we 
still have to give philosophical reasons for motivating our formal approaches; 
we have to provide an answer for what are possible worlds, what are possi-
ble individuals, why the thesis of rigid designation holds, how to differen-
tiate between proper names and definite descriptions, what are the condi-
tions and commitments of essentialism etc.15
 Despite the fact that the received view claims that Kripke has answered 
Quine’s animadversions, the whole point of the (RV) is just becoming 
more complex, since according to Ballarin (2004, 609) “surprisingly, 
Quine’s best ally on these matters turns out to be the very philosopher who 
 
                                                     
who cites the words of Bishop Butler in his “Identity and Necessity”: ‘everything is what 
it is and not another thing.’ 
15  At this point one could note again the parallel with Neurath, since he also claimed 
that “[…] as long as semantics appears as pure calculus I have nothing to say, assumed 
that your calculus is consistent” (Neurath to Carnap, April 1, 1944, ASP RC 102-55-
05). For Neurath, formal and technical achievements were one thing, but ‘philosophical’ 
and scientific considerations were another. I say ‘philosophical’ since Neurath thought 
that philosophy wasn’t something higher than science and he always tried to get rid of 
philosophy. In this case Neurath was a naturalist like Quine (1995/2008, 467) who 
claimed that “naturalized philosophy is continuous with natural science”. 
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engineered the possible worlds model theory: Saul Kripke.” In one of his 
articles Kripke formulates this point as follows:16
 These passages show that Kripke’s attitude and metaphilosophical 
stance towards these matters were just the same as Quine’s. Kripke is em-
phasizing that though model-theoretic formulations could provide suitable 
formal criterions with important mathematical results we have to be cau-
tious when we are using formal logic in our argumentations. Formal logic 
  
Philosophers should not confuse their own particular philosophical doctrines 
with the basic results and procedures of mathematical logic. (Kripke 1976, 
408; italics in the original) 
Philosophers often become so overjoyed, however, when they have 
found formal criteria for the success of some project that its intuitive 
basis is often disregarded like a ladder which can easily be kicked away 
after it has been climbed. […] it is as if it were thought that any tech-
nical criterion, however loosely defended, is superior to a mere (!) philo-
sophical argument. (Kripke 1976, 411) 
Philosophers should maintain a proper skepticism of attempts easily to settle 
linguistic or other empirical questions by quick a priori formal considerations. 
(Kripke 1976, 412; italics in the original) 
Philosophers should have a better sense of both the power and the limitations 
of formal and mathematical techniques. (Kripke 1976, 413; italics in the 
original) 
Logical investigations can obviously be a useful tool for philosophy. 
They must, however, be informed by a sensitivity to the philosophical 
significance of the formalism and by a generous admixture of common 
sense, as well as a thorough understanding both of the basic concepts 
and of the technical details of the formal material used. It should not be 
supposed that the formalism can grind out philosophical results in  
a manner beyond the capacity of ordinary philosophical reasoning. 
There is no mathematical substitute for philosophy. (Kripke 1976, 416) 
                                                     
16  See further Zvolenszky (2007) who also considers these quotations and their impor-
tance in the Quine-Kripke debate. 
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is just the first step when we try to defeat certain points of view but surely 
not the last. “There is no mathematical substitute for philosophy.” 
 Interestingly Kripke was fully aware of the status of his model-theoretic 
semantics. For example, in his earliest formal articles, where he first formu-
lated possible-worlds semantics, Kripke mentions Quine only two times – 
but what is more important, he did it only in certain insignificant con-
texts.17
 The other reference can be found in “A Completeness Theorem in 
Modal Logic” (see Kripke 1959a, 9) where Kripke is citing Quine’s “Three 
Grades of Modal Involvement”. In the citation Kripke is not responding to 
Quine’s animadversions but mentions one of Quine’s formulae, namely 
(∀x)(∀y)(x = y) ⊃ (x = y)).
 Firstly Kripke is mentioning Quine’s Mathematical Logic with re-
spect to the question that we shall formulate quantificational theory in  
a way which allows only closed formulae but there is no mention of the 
modalities (Kripke 1963/1971, 69, and note 14).  
18 Regardless of the overall importance of this 
formula, it shows that Kripke was aware of Quine’s writings about modality 
in 1958 when he was preparing his article while still in high school. Later 
Kripke applied to Harvard University where Quine was teaching. It is inter-
esting since that time Quine was already famous for his remarks against 
modal logic so Kripke should have known this.19
 After these publications, however, we can find no trace in Kripke’s logi-
cal articles from the time that he was considering his formal semantics as  
a response to Quine’s philosophical expectations.
 
20
                                                     
17  Kripke is referring to Quine quite a few times in his first two lectures of Naming 
and Necessity but I will just sketch this issue at the end of the paper since they belong 
mainly to the second phase of their debate, namely to the philosophical considerations 
of the modalities. Cf. Zvolenszky (2007). 
18  Burgess (1998/2008, 212, n8) notes that virtually this formula was the only explicit 
contribution of Quine to the formal theory of modal logic. 
19  Cf. Marcus (2010), who reports a similar attitude against modal logic from Harvard. 
20  Kripke (1963/1971, 65-66) discussed the various philosophical theories (Frege, Rus-
sell, Strawson) of descriptions but he considers them as merely a starting point of the 
formal investigations. Similarly none of Kripke’s early model-theoretic works (cf. Kripke 
1959b; 1963a; 1963b) contains any reference to Quine or his animadversions. 
 Consequently we can 
plausibly assume that Kripke’s intention was not to undermine the whole of 
Quine’s position with respect to the modalities. What is more interesting is 
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that the logical community was not seeing Kripke’s writings as a response 
to Quine that time either despite the suggestion of the received view. 
 Firstly none of the (relatively few) reviews of Kripke mentions the name 
or the animadversions of Quine – and especially none of them articulates 
that Kripke has provided an answer to Quine (see Bayart 1966b; Kaplan 
1966; Gabbay 1969). Arnould Bayart’s review of Kripke’s “A Completeness 
Theorem in Modal Logic” was put in The Journal of Symbolic Logic on ex-
actly the same page where Bayart’s other review of E. J. Lemmon has been 
published. In the latter review Bayart (1966a) doomed modal logic to be 
too obscure and vague without the relevant semantical constructions and 
metalogical results. This is important because in his review of Kripke (on 
the same page) Bayart did not mention that Kripke would provide all of 
these results while the received view indeed claims this. 
 It is also curious that in the literature from the late 1950s until the late 
1960s almost none of the relevant logical journals (like The Journal of Sym-
bolic Logic, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Bulletin of the American 
Mathematical Society, Studia Logica, Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und 
Grundlagen der Mathematik) contains any reference to Quine’s animadver-
sions or to Kripke’s alleged answers. The logicians were occupied with the 
systems of J. C. C. McKinsey, J. Łukasiewicz and it is hard to find any ar-
ticle on modal logic which does not refer to B. Sobociński. This suggests 
that the relevant scholars have discovered the works of Kripke relatively 
late. The usually discussed logician, Sören Halldén (1969, 306), for exam-
ple, in his 1969 review of the debate between Lemmon and Henderson 
about “Is there only one correct system of modal logic?” argues that Lem-
mon’s attempts to show that while the M, S4 and S5 systems require dif-
ferent strategies and all of them are legitimate is just “[…] impressionistic, 
but suggestive.” The problem is that while the debate between Lemmon 
and Henderson took place in 1969 we usually think that Kripke’s article 
which settled the questions about the legitimacy of the various modal sys-
tems was published already in 1963. 
 Of course there were exceptions in the literature. For example, M. J. 
Cresswell (1967; 1968) published several (quite positive) articles explicitly 
about Kripke in the Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic in the 1960s. 
Cresswell’s role is important because his book on modal logic with G. E. 
Hughes from 1968 was one of the first textbooks about modal logic and it 
used the Kripke-semantics substantively. The other exception is the afore-
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mentioned E. J. Lemmon (1966a; 1966b) who tried to synthetize the alge-
braic and semantical approaches to modal logic that discussed and analyzed 
Kripke’s works in a positive and subtle manner. 
 All of these suggest that the philosophical and logical atmosphere of 
the 1950s and 1960s wasn’t after all so receptive with respect to Quine ani-
madversions and Kripke’s alleged answers. Two more points, however, need 
to be mentioned. First, if the logical community was inactive in answering 
Quine’s philosophical animadversions (and for the right reason) who is re-
sponsible for the confusion of the formal and philosophical points? Burgess 
(1998/2008, 216) suggests that the confusion “is represented in the com-
pendium by the suggestion that disputes about quantified modal logic 
should be conducted with reference to a ‘semantic construction’ in which 
connection the now superseded approach of Carnap is expounded (with the 
now standard, then unpublished, approach of Kripke being alluded to as an 
alternative in the discussion).” Burgess is referring here to the 1962 Boston 
colloquium where Quine and Marcus (along with Kripke and Føllesdal) 
discussed the questions of modal logic. Though he is not saying explicitly 
but he is quoting from Marcus’ presentation and in order to understand the 
point let’s see what was at stake. 
 Marcus (1961, 316) said that “I would like in conclusion to suggest that 
the polemics of modal logic are perhaps best carried out in terms of some 
explicit semantical construction. As we have seen […] it is awkward at best 
and at worst has the character of a quibble, not to do so.” The mentioned 
semantical construction corresponds to the formal considerations of the 
debate since Marcus (1961, 322, n19.) refers to Carnap’s Meaning and Ne-
cessity which was viewed then as a formal statement of modal logic.21 But 
she is mentioning Kripke’s early abstract about the semantics of modal log-
ic (see Kripke 1959b) too which contains only the formal aspects of the 
question.22
                                                     
21  Whether Carnap’s Meaning and Necessity is rightly considered as a purely formal 
work in the context of the formal-philosophical distinction of Quine is a further ques-
tion in the light of the recent works of Carnap-scholars who highlight the philosophical 
character of Carnap’s ideal of explication which is used in his book.  
22  Interestingly while the English editions of the article (cf. Marcus 1961, 322, n20; 
1962/1993, 23, n20) contain the reference to Kripke, one cannot find it in the Hunga-
rian translation (cf. Marcus 1962/1985). 
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 The confusion surfaces also in the closure of Marcus’ article (1961, 
321): “In such a model modal operators have to do with truth relative to 
the model, not with things. On this interpretation, Professor Quine’s 
‘flight from intension’ may have been exhilarating, but unnecessary.” 
Though the 1993 edition of the paper does not contain the “not with 
things” phrase it was in the first edition and shows well the intention of 
Marcus, just like her footnote (cf. Marcus 1961, 322, n21): “If one wishes 
to talk about possible things then of course such a construction is inade-
quate.” This remark is about things and not models, so it seems to suggest 
that Marcus is concerning with the philosophical and not the formal issues. 
But the context (and actually the whole paper) makes it clear that for Mar-
cus “possible things” are related to the varying domains conception of 
quantification (in her semantics the domains of ‘possible’ individuals and 
quantification coincide). Thus in her paper (mentioned by Burgess) Marcus 
did not response to the formal/philosophical distinction of Quine and while 
she talks about both types of problems at the same she considers only the 
possible formal solutions under the aegis of semantics and thing. 
 The second point is that, as I suggested along with Zvolenszky (2007) 
and Burgess (2013, chapters 3-4), Kripke was fully aware of what he is 
doing and what he has to do in order to meet the interpretational chal-
lenges of Quine. After showing the formal correctness of modal logic he 
moved on and tried to give philosophical motivations and justifications for 
his main moves. This is to be found in his famous lectures of Naming and 
Necessity. 
 Regarding the above mentioned argument of Quine against modal 
logic based on the essentialist charge, the usual method was to attack 
Quine’s first premise, pointing out that QML is not committed to essen-
tialism because the problematic essentialist theses cannot be deduced in 
the systems of QML. As we saw, Quine has never claimed that it is the 
case. Kripke took part in those discussions from 1962 where Quine made 
his points explicit against Marcus. While Marcus didn’t seem to grasp 
what the core of Quine’s animadversions against essentialism were, Kripke 
responded more sympathetically to his ideas. In Naming and Necessity he 
didn’t claim that one cannot deduce the essentialist theses in QML be-
cause it was just irrelevant for Quine’s challenges. What he did is to show 
that Quine’s second premise, that essentialism is an untenable, incoherent 
view, does not hold. 
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 To show this, Kripke is using a fictive dialogue:  
Suppose that someone said, pointing to Nixon, ‘That’s the guy who 
might have lost’. Someone else says ‘Oh no, if you describe him as 
“Nixon”, then he might have lost; but of course, describing him as the 
winner, then it is not true that he might have lost’. Now which one is 
being the philosopher, here, the unintuitive man? It seems to me ob-
viously to be the second. The second man has a philosophical theory. 
The first man would say, and with great conviction, ‘Well, of course, 
the winner of the election might have been someone else. The actual win-
ner, had the course of the campaign been different, might have been the 
loser, and someone else the winner; or there might have been no elec-
tion at all. So, such terms as “the winner” and “the loser” don’t desig-
nate the same objects in all possible worlds. On the other hand, the 
term “Nixon” is just a name of this man’. When you ask whether it is 
necessary of contingent that Nixon who won the election, you are ask-
ing the intuitive question whether in some counterfactual situation, this 
man would in fact have lost the election. If someone thinks that the 
notion of a necessary or contingent property (forget whether there are 
any nontrivial necessary properties [and consider] just the meaningfulness 
of the notion) is a philosopher’s notion with no intuitive content, he is 
wrong. (Kripke 1980/1990, 41-42) 
 Kripke is pointing out that the distinction between accidental and es-
sential properties is not an ad hoc technical distinction of philosophy but 
we recognize and use it already in our daily discussions and language games. 
We understand those claims intuitively which consider the modal features 
of objects. He also mentions that the question is not whether there are any 
(nontrivial) essential properties – what he is interested in is whether it is 
meaningful to talk about such things: and that is what Quine was doing in 
his weak essentialist charges as we have seen above. 
 Naming and Necessity, however, contains a lot more material where 
Kripke explicitly aims to meet the philosophical challenges of Quine: he 
tries to motive his distinction between proper names and descriptions with 
a lot of examples and thought experiments based on everyday linguistic 
practices; he tries to rehabilitate some of the modal notions and show their 
intuitive content but we cannot consider here all of them. 
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4. Summary 
 The textbook-like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, 
received views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have wit-
nessed a huge amount of historical works that aimed to reconsider our 
narratives of the history of analytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. 
 The present study is meant to present such a micro story which is still 
in many ways untouched by historians. In section 1 I characterized the re-
ceived view about Quine and modal logic with six dogmas and considered 
here the first two of them. In section 2 I tried to show that while the re-
ceived view claimed QML does not commit one to essentialism, since the 
essentialist theses cannot be derived in the usual systems, Quine’s animad-
versions were based on different grounds. He was talking about the in-
tended meaning of modal notions and the philosophical interpretation of 
modal language. To shed some light on this point in section 3 I placed the 
early writings of Kripke in the context of Quine’s requirements. While the 
received view states that Quine’s arguments against modal logic have been 
met by the famous possible-worlds semantics of Kripke we saw that his 
formal semantics was never meant to defeat Quine’s more philosophical ar-
gumentations and Quine has accepted the results of Kripke’s formal-
mathematical investigations. What were at stake were no less than the phi-
losophical ideas and motivations of modality and essentialism and these are 
just the topics of Naming and Necessity. 
 If we could accept this historical interpretation of the network between 
Quine, Kripke and modal logic, we have to conclude that Quine’s real phi-
losophical animadversions against the modalities are still on the table: 
though Kripke has provided some important considerations which were 
widely accepted among philosophers in the second half of twentieth cen-
tury, Quine had his own positive philosophical ideas about modality based 
on his Humean basic stance which didn’t get any attention in the literature 
yet. 
 Also there is the account of David Lewis in his On the Plurality of 
Worlds which is just as extensional and reductive as Quine has always re-
quired it. Lewis and Quine shared almost the same metaphilosophical 
commitments and attitudes (see Soames 2015) and though Lewis did not 
mention the name of Quine, his efforts in On the Plurality of Worlds could 
be read as an answer to the Quinean challenges:  
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When I say that possible worlds help with the analysis of modality, I do 
not mean that they help with the metalogical ‘semantical analysis of 
modal logic’. Recent interest in possible worlds began there, to be sure. 
But wrongly. For that job, we need no possible worlds. We need sets of 
entities which, for heuristic guidance, ‘may be regarded as’ possible 
worlds, but which in truth may be anything you please. We are doing 
mathematics, not metaphysics. Where we need possible worlds, rather, 
is in applying the results of these metalogical investigations. Metalogical 
results, in themselves, answer no questions about the logic of modality. 
(Lewis 1986, 19) 
 Lewis claims just the same as Quine did: formal-logical investigations 
answer the technical problems while for his interpretational challenges one 
requires more substantial ‘philosophical-scientific’ investigations. As Lewis 
(1986, 20) said, “It is the substantive theory, not the metalogic, for which 
we need possible worlds.”23
                                                     
23  Similar ideas are to be found in Lewis’ Convention, see Lewis (1969/2002, 207-208). 
 
 But the metaphysics of possible worlds is just one possible answer to 
Quine and in these philosophical questions there aren’t any final answers. 
In a different context Kripke (1973/2013, 155) said that we have a certain 
tendency at similar point to throw up our hands. Whether we throw them 
up or not, the debate about the modalities is still on the table and the ideas 
of Quine should deserve a fresh start. 
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